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9	Attorneys for Respondent		
10	IN THE LIMITED STATES DIST	DICT COLU	OT.
11	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
13	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION		
14	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION		
15	DERRECK E. SUNDERLAND,	07-0534	5 CRB
16	Petitioner,		NDENT'S REPLY TO TION TO MOTION MISS
17 18 19	JAMES D. HARTLEY, Acting Warden,  Respondent.	Judge:	The Honorable Charles R. Breyer
20	Respondent moved this Court to dismiss Derreck Sunderland's Petition for Writ of Habeas		
21	Corpus on the grounds that: (1) his Petition is moot because Sunderland received a subsequent		
22	parole consideration hearing that comports with due process; (2) as to his challenge to his plea		
23	agreement, his Petition is successive, and he failed to obtain an appellate order authorizing the		
24	Court to consider his claim; and (3) his Petition involves questions of state law and do not entitle		
25	him to federal habeas relief. Sunderland's contentions in opposition are without merit, and		
26	Respondent's Motion should be granted.		
27	First, Sunderland claims that his Petition is not moot because his May 2007 hearing also		
28	violated due process. (Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 11-14.) Yet, Sunderland has received the only		
	Resp't's Reply to Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss		Sunderland v. Hartley

effective relief that he can be granted — a new parole hearing that comports with due process. 2 See Benny v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 295 F.3d 977, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002) (parole board must 3 exercise discretion in determining whether an inmate is suitable for parole). If he wishes to 4 challenge his 2007 hearing as violating due process, then it is a new claim and he must file a new petition. 5 6 Second, Sunderland asserts that his challenge to his plea agreement is not successive 7

because his two petitions challenge different parole hearings and different aspects of his plea agreement. (Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 4-7.) But the basic thrust of Sunderland's claim is to again challenge the validity of his plea agreement. (See generally, Petn.) Because Sunderland was required to obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before bringing his successive petition to this Court (and the record indicates no such order), the Petition should be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 529.

Third, Sunderland attempts to frame his challenge to the Board of Parole Hearings' (Board) alleged failure to conduct a timely subsequent parole consideration hearing as a federal law issue. (Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 7-9.) This attempt is without merit. Sunderland's Petition challenges the construction of state statutes and regulations regarding the manner in which the Board conducts parole suitability hearings. As such, Sunderland's claims are predicated on state law and not cognizable in federal habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 1983); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (habeas petition may not transform a state law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a due process violation). Moreover, although Sunderland does not explain why In re Rutherford does not apply to him, his claims regarding the timeliness of his parole hearing is already being heard as a state-action in In re Rutherford, where the Marin County Superior Court has jurisdiction over all overdue parole consideration hearings. (In re Rutherford, Super. Ct. Marin County, 2004, No. SC135399A).)

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<sup>1.</sup> Similarly, the state courts have repeatedly rejected Sunderland's challenges to his plea agreement. (Mot. to Dismiss at Ex. C; Petn. at Ex. 1; see In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767.)

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## DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL

Case Name: Sunderland v. Hartley

No.: 07-05345 CRB

I declare:

I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.

On June 20, 2008, I served the attached

## RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000, San Francisco, CA 94102-7004, addressed as follows:

Derreck Sunderland, C-84327 Avenal State Prison P.O. Box 9 Avenal, CA 93204 in pro per

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on **June 20, 2008**, at San Francisco, California.

M.M. Argarin	de de Argain	
Declarant	Signature	

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